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U.S. policymakers are understandably focused on prodding the economy out of the current recession. There is a robust debate about how to achieve this goal, but a fairly broad 
consensus about the longer term: both theory and empirical evidence 
support the primacy of technological innovation in advancing long-
term economic growth and, ultimately, human welfare. Innovation is 
also central to addressing the environmental and other challenges that 
can accompany economic growth. Thus questions of how to foster 
technological innovation are, quite properly, at the forefront of both 
scholarly analysis and policy debate.
Commentators have discussed at length 
a variety of substantive innovation in-
puts and incentives—for example, pat-
ents, trade secrecy, government fund-
ing and procurement, availability of 
venture capital, ownership of innova-
tion “platforms” and “infrastructure,” 
science and engineering education, 
university technology transfer, compe-
tition, concentration, innovation prizes, 
and open and/or collaborative strate-
gies. Identifying these substantive poli-
cies is important, but so too is analyzing 
how to design U.S. government institu-
tions that have the best chance of suc-
cessfully spurring innovation. And not-
withstanding the growing attention to 
U.S. innovation policy, the issue of how 
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We propose that Presi-
dent Obama create an 
Office of Innovation 
Policy and provide it 
with authority to be able 
to have a significant 
positive impact on inno-
vation policy.
Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy:
Creating a White House Office of 
Innovation Policy
to structure U.S. innovation policy is 
a relatively under-examined area.1 Dis-
cussions of specific legal/regulatory 
systems that have a significant impact 
on innovation (e.g., patents or anti-
trust) tend to focus rather narrowly on 
the particular tools that might be avail-
able to agencies and courts that operate 
within that system. 
This report conducts a broad examina-
tion of the relationship between fed-
eral regulatory institutions and U.S. 
innovation policy. We propose improv-
ing U.S. innovation policy by creating 
a White House Office of Innovation 
Policy (OIP) to review federal agencies’ 
actions that affect innovation. 
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We begin with a discussion of innovation’s importance 
to the future well-being of American society. We then 
discuss limitations of the current federal framework for 
making innovation policy. Specifically, the relative ab-
sence of innovation from the agenda of Congress and 
many relevant federal agencies—as well as interagency 
processes such as the centralized cost-benefit review 
performed by the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB)—manifests the confluence of two 
regulatory challenges: first, the tendency of political 
actors to focus on short-term goals and consequenc-
es; and second, political actors’ reluctance to threaten 
powerful incumbent actors. Courts, meanwhile, lack 
sufficient expertise and the ability to conduct the type 
of forward-looking policy planning that should be a 
hallmark of innovation policy. 
Ultimately, our analysis leads us to propose that Presi-
dent Obama (or Congress, if Congress is willing) cre-
ate a White House OIP that would have the specific 
mission of being the “innovation champion” within 
these processes. We envision OIP as an entity that 
would be independent of existing federal agencies and 
that would have more than mere hortatory influence. 
It would have some authority to push agencies to act 
in a manner that either affirmatively promoted innova-
tion or achieved a particular regulatory objective in a 
manner least damaging to innovation. We also envi-
sion OIP as an entity that would operate efficiently by 
drawing upon, and feeding into, existing interagency 
processes within OIRA and other relevant White 
House offices (e.g., the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy). It is important to note that OIP would not 
be designed to thwart federal regulation; as a matter of 
fact, in some cases, the existence of OIP might lead to 
increased federal regulation (e.g., more Environmen-
tal Protection Agency regulations might pass muster 
under cost-benefit analysis if innovation-related effects 
were calculated). 
Why InnovaTIon polIcy should be a prIorITy for 
The u.s. governmenT
a.  Why Innovation Is Important
In the long run, productivity is the key to economic 
growth. There is no natural limit on growth in pro-
ductivity, and in fact, productivity growth has swung 
wildly among different countries. Many factors affect 
productivity growth, but innovation is particularly im-
portant. By “innovation,” we mean the development 
and deployment of technological improvements. This 
definition of innovation is not only tractable but it also 
comports with the most recent data on drivers of U.S. 
productivity growth. Specifically, the United States ex-
perienced average annual productivity increases of less 
than 1½ percent between 1980 and 1995, but it has av-
eraged increases of more than 2½ percent since 1995.2 
The best explanation for the more recent U.S. produc-
tivity increases is the widespread diffusion of advances 
in information and communications technology.3
Innovation is highly cumulative—building on earlier 
discoveries and developments—and small changes 
in conditions at a particular time can have large fu-
ture impacts on the course of innovation. Any current 
event can have an impact on later events, of course. 
But the failure to, say, tax a complex transaction at time 
T1 can be ameliorated by taxing it at time T2. If the 
government nets the same amount of constant dollars, 
then the difference of timing is small. By contrast, the 
failure to sufficiently encourage an innovation at time 
T1 may mean that innovators at time T2 lack a crucial 
building block and hence that the course of innovation 
is significantly retarded.
Notably, although our discussion equates innovation 
with technological change, “innovation policy” is in 
our view quite distinct from what might be called “tech-
nology policy” (over which the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy has jurisdiction). Innovation policy 
is both narrower and broader than technology policy. 
It is narrower in that it focuses on how to promote the 
creation and diffusion of technology, whereas technol-
ogy policy encompasses a wider range of substantive 
policy goals (for example, non-instrumental concerns 
about civil rights and civil liberties). At the same time, 
innovation policy is broader in its range of regulatory 
components, in that innovation policy ranges beyond a 
focus on technology per se to encompass, for example, 
antitrust and education policy.
b.  Why the u.s. government needs to play a role in 
Innovation
In light of innovation’s enormous importance to the 
future well-being of American society, a key question 
is what, if anything, the U.S. government should do to 
foster innovation. The answer cannot be “nothing.” At 
a minimum, the government needs to establish the le-
gal institutions that allow for efficiency in both market 
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transactions and the formation of firms. Furthermore, 
optimal levels of innovation will sometimes—perhaps 
often—require government action beyond that in-
volved in ordinary competitive markets. 
Economists have long advanced good theoretical and 
empirical arguments for why markets will not allow 
innovators to capture a sufficient percentage of the 
welfare benefits they produce.4 With early-stage or 
large-scale research, the benefits may be too uncertain, 
long term, and diffuse to monetize, let alone control. 
Problems of uncertainty and lack of appropriability are 
less acute for more directed innovation, but even then 
controlling inexpensive copying is likely to be difficult. 
Consequently, government incentives for innovation—
whether they take the form of patents, allocation to 
private parties of spectrum rights, prizes, research 
funding, tax incentives, or other mechanisms—are 
important.
More generally, in the last several decades the weight 
of economic authority has decisively turned against 
Robert Solow’s view that technical change is an ex-
ogenous variable that cannot be influenced by policy.5 
Leading growth theorists like Paul Romer have dem-
onstrated that innovation is endogenously determined 
and emerges as a consequence of knowledge externali-
ties and spillovers; such externalities and spillovers, in 
turn, represent variables that many forms of govern-
ment policy, including but not limited to subsidies, can 
affect.6 
WhaT currenT u.s. governmenT polIcy geTs 
Wrong
a. Why government Institutions slight Innovation policy 
Absent measures designed to foster careful thinking 
about innovation, it will likely be systematically ig-
nored and/or misunderstood by government actors. In 
the discussion that follows, we give examples of coun-
terproductive U.S. regulatory behavior with respect to 
innovation. 
A skeptic might note that counterproductive regula-
tory behavior is likely to be a pervasive phenomenon 
no matter what the substantive policy goal, but there 
are several reasons to believe that it will be even more 
pervasive in the context of innovation than in the con-
text of other goals. First, almost by definition, inno-
vation involves thinking about long-term outcomes, 
many difficult to conceive. U.S. political actors have 
very little incentive to force themselves to think about 
long-term outcomes because they are unlikely to be 
around to reap credit (or blame). Relatedly, the politi-
cal pressures of dealing with day-to-day exigencies lead 
many political actors to give short shrift to long-term 
outcomes and the role of innovation.
Absent measures designed to foster careful thinking about inno-
vation, it will likely be systematically ignored and/or misunder-
stood by government actors.
Second, the theoretical and empirical literature indi-
cates that start-up firms are particularly likely to be 
the sources of breakthrough or disruptive innova-
tion. On the theoretical side, economists from Joseph 
Schumpeter onwards have noted that such entrepre-
neurial firms may be more likely than incumbents 
with vested interests in existing products to be able to 
move outside routine tasks into “untried technologi-
cal possibilit[ies].”7 As an empirical matter, the data 
indicate that significant innovations, particularly in 
fields like biotechnology and information technology, 
have been driven by new entrants.8 Unfortunately, in-
cumbent firms are generally better organized and have 
more lobbying clout than upstarts.9
Even U.S. government institutions such as courts that 
are not constrained by political considerations are 
likely to systematically neglect innovation policy. The 
reason is that courts must act ex post, in the context of 
the limited information put forward in the particular 
dispute that is brought before them.  In fact, even the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
is tasked with managing a system (the U.S. patent sys-
tem) that has innovation as its sole reason for existence, 
has tended explicitly to disavow policy analysis. As a 
consequence of this disavowal, the patent system has 
embraced software patents of broad and often unclear 
scope without considering the patent thickets that 
such allowance would create for the highly cumulative 
process of software development.10 In contrast, patent 
scope with respect to genes has been relatively narrow 
even though a broader scope would arguably be more 
aligned with innovation goals, at least with respect to 
genes that cover therapeutic proteins.
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b. piecemeal approaches to Innovation by u.s.  
government entities
Even when U.S. government entities like federal agen-
cies and courts actually focus on innovation, they 
generally act without having much awareness of what 
other institutions faced with similar problems have 
done—much less coordinating with those institutions. 
Improving the awareness and coordination of inno-
vation-related activities among federal agencies and 
courts could be tremendously helpful. 
Consider as one example the recurrent debate among 
legal scholars and economic analysts over how best to 
regulate technology platforms—that is, basic or infra-
structural innovation that is difficult to invent around 
and can serve as the basis for much future innovation. 
Embedded within this inquiry are several important 
subsidiary inquiries. First, a government regulator must 
make a threshold assessment of the degree to which the 
innovation in question is in fact a platform technology. 
Second, assuming that the regulator has determined 
that a given innovation is in fact a platform, it must de-
termine whether the owner of the technology is likely 
to exploit it in a manner that is detrimental to innova-
tion. Third, assuming that the regulator is worried that 
a monopolist will not optimally deploy its platform, 
the regulator will have to determine whether to act ex 
ante, before concrete problems have arisen, or ex post. 
These economic questions arise with any platform-
based innovation, no matter the science behind the 
platform or the specific applications to which it is put. 
When, for example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) or the Federal Circuit makes a decision 
regarding the treatment of extremely broad claims in 
a patent on embryonic stem cells (a trio of such broad 
patents was granted and subsequently challenged), it 
might consider lessons learned by Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) regulators that have con-
sidered the issue of property rights over (or compelled 
access to) platforms. The debates about the viability 
and contours of an essential facilities doctrine could 
help to inform a decisionmaker at the National Insti-
tutes of Health faced with the question of whether to 
declare that no patent rights should be sought on a par-
ticular genome sequencing project.
Platform technologies do not represent the only area 
in which multiple federal agencies are likely to have 
important arguments that other agencies should be lis-
tening to. The 2003 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
report suggesting mechanisms for improvement of the 
patent system, for example, was motivated by the prop-
osition that issues of competition policy and innova-
tion policy overlap.11 More fundamentally, every new 
area of technology represents another venue for decid-
ing whether competition or quasi-monopoly rights is 
the best mechanism for promoting innovation. Yet in 
issue area after issue area, these policy challenges are 
addressed on an ad hoc, agency-specific basis.
The lack of coordination among agencies is particu-
larly challenging for innovations that represent tech-
nological convergence and have wide-ranging applica-
tions. For example, the so-called “minimal genome” 
that synthetic biologists seek to develop (and on which 
Craig Venter has recently sought a patent) could be 
used in a wide variety of industries, ranging from clean 
energy to pharmaceuticals. Currently, innovation in 
energy and pharmaceuticals is regulated in the United 
States by a large number of different federal agencies—
ranging from the National Institutes of Health and the 
Food and Drug Administration (pharmaceuticals) to 
the Department of Energy and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (energy).
With the abolition of the congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment in the mid-1990s, the ability 
of Congress to secure unbiased advice on questions 
of innovation policy is also quite limited. Moreover, 
even with unbiased advice, it is not clear that Congress 
would be capable of acting in a systematic manner 
with respect to innovation. Although the passage of 
the America COMPETES (Creating Opportunities to 
Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Ed-
ucation, and Science) Act is a positive sign, Congress’s 
failure to fund the act at authorized levels in the first 
year mitigates this success. 
Federal agencies’ failure to coordinate innovation poli-
cy often leads to inconsistency and incoherence in fed-
eral policies. As an example, the PTO has insinuated it-
self into middle of the complex questions involving the 
regulation of “Voice over Internet Protocol” (VoIP) 
telephony by granting broad and possibly invalid pat-
ents over key elements of such telephony to a num-
ber of large incumbent providers, including Verizon, 
Sprint, and AT&T. The PTO almost assuredly had no 
particular intention to regulate the battle over VoIP. To 
the contrary, thinking about VoIP has been the prov-
ince of the FCC, which views VoIP as a valuable alter-
native to local landline telephony.12 Nevertheless, the 
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PTO’s issuance of broad patents has allowed Verizon, 
Sprint, and AT&T to pursue via government-granted 
property rights what they have been unable to achieve 
via FCC regulation. These large incumbents filed suits 
based on broad patents that seriously damaged a much 
smaller start-up, Vonage, that has implemented VoIP 
successfully.13 If the large incumbent firms’ patents are 
in fact valid, then some payment to Verizon, Sprint, 
and AT&T is appropriate. But the threatened remedy 
of injunctive relief—in the shadow of which Vonage 
settled the various lawsuits for large sums of money—
conflicts with the FCC policy of promoting more com-
petition in telephony markets.14
The PTO’s intervention with respect to VoIP was 
largely inadvertent, but in some situations the fail-
ure to coordinate some aspect of innovation policy 
flows from federal agencies’ conflicting agendas. This 
problem has arisen in U.S. spectrum policy. Although 
innovation in wireless services depends on the avail-
ability of radio frequencies, the management of these 
frequencies has been characterized by difficulties aris-
ing from the involvement of different agencies with 
competing goals. One might imagine that conflicts in 
spectrum policy would arise between the FCC (which 
manages the allocation of commercial spectrum) and 
the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) (which manages the spectrum 
assigned to the government), and these agencies have 
indeed differed on spectrum policy. But the conflicts 
between these two agencies and the Department of De-
fense (the largest government user of spectrum) have 
been more notable and pitched.15 The Department of 
Defense resisted spectrum liberalization proposals put 
forward in the late 1990s and 2000, and it successfully 
thwarted attempts at revamping its spectrum alloca-
tions. Top spectrum officials agree that “the FCC, 
NTIA, and Congress have created a bureaucratic mo-
rass of [spectrum] regulations and oversight that im-
pedes progress.”16
Given that different federal agencies have different 
missions, it is not surprising that there are both regula-
tory overlaps and regulatory lacunae. Both phenom-
ena can lead to lack of coordination and inefficiency, 
as federal agencies often take actions in tension with 
those of another agency (in the case of overlaps) or 
take actions that are outside their core area of exper-
tise and in the process do a poor job. An example of 
regulatory overlaps is the jurisdiction of multiple fed-
eral agencies over U.S. telecommunications mergers. 
Such mergers are reviewed by the FCC, as well as by 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the 
FTC. Those agencies often apply different standards 
and often reach differing results (for purposes of inno-
vation and otherwise), leading to much wasted effort 
for regulators and the regulated parties. 
An example of a regulatory lacuna is the FCC’s attempt 
at protecting television producers’ copyrights via copy 
control mechanisms known as “broadcast flags.” Con-
tent owners expressed fears about unauthorized shar-
ing of their programming once such programming 
became digital, and they lobbied the FCC to require 
devices capable of receiving digital television signals 
to recognize the broadcast flag created by content pro-
ducers. The FCC had little background or expertise in 
matters of copyright and copy control, and indeed it 
had no obvious jurisdiction: Congress never saw fit to 
give the FCC authority over consumers’ use of televi-
sion receivers after the completion of a broadcast trans-
mission.17 But content producers correctly thought the 
FCC would be sympathetic to their concerns, and as a 
result, the FCC mandated the broadcast flag, resting 
not on any explicit grant of jurisdiction over copying 
or copyright but instead on its “ancillary jurisdiction.”18 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated 
the FCC’s order as beyond its jurisdiction. Beyond the 
jurisdictional problem, however, there was good rea-
son to doubt the wisdom of the FCC’s approach. The 
broadcast flag responded to a problem that had not yet 
arisen by imposing significant restrictions on the ar-
chitecture of consumer equipment and thereby mak-
ing legal copying and use more difficult. The FCC had 
regulated outside its area of core expertise at the behest 
of a politically powerful constituency that feared that 
otherwise their concerns would go unheeded, and the 
result was a regulatory venture that diverted govern-
ment attention from more appropriate means of limit-
ing piracy.
In other cases, the organic statutes enacted by Con-
gress explicitly create tensions between federal agen-
cies. As matters currently stand, for example, patents 
are interpreted not simply by the PTO and the courts 
that review the PTO but also by the International 
Trade Commission (ITC). The PTO interprets patent 
applications and patents under the Patent Act, but the 
ITC interprets patents in the context of its own organic 
statute, the Tariff Act. Under section 1337 of the Tariff 
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Act, the ITC can block imported articles that infringe 
U.S. patents held by domestic industries. Moreover, ac-
cording to the ITC, because it has a different source of 
statutory authority, it is not always bound by the patent 
interpretations that the PTO and the courts develop 
when they interpret the Patent Act. To the contrary, 
the ITC claims it should receive deference to its legal 
interpretations even when its interpretations diverge 
from those that might be rendered under the Patent 
Act. The ITC’s argument has been accepted by the very 
court, the Federal Circuit, that reviews the PTO.19
c.  limitations of current federal mechanisms for     
centralized review of u.s. regulatory actions 
To the many scholars who have studied the last 25 
years of presidential efforts to exercise greater cen-
tralized control of federal agency actions, some of the 
problems discussed in the prior section will have a fa-
miliar ring. In the past, there have been some efforts 
to exert greater centralized control over regulatory ac-
tions. One question that arises, therefore, is the extent 
to which current mechanisms of centralized review of 
federal agencies’ actions could support the develop-
ment of a coordinated set of innovation-friendly pol-
icies—at least in those cases where the inconsistency 
is not created by Congress, and courts do not act at 
cross-purposes with such coordination. 
Presidential efforts to exert greater centralized control 
have typically been promoted as attempts to counter 
the parochialism of federal agencies and to harmonize 
conflicts between such agencies, particularly in the area 
of risk regulation. The most systematic mechanism 
through which greater presidential control has been 
pursued is a series of executive orders imposing the 
somewhat controversial requirement that federal agen-
cies conduct cost-benefit analyses of major regulations. 
Centralized review of these analyses is then conducted 
by OIRA, an office within OMB. OIRA’s reviews of 
agencies’ cost-benefit analyses began with the Rea-
gan administration and have continued in some form 
through succeeding administrations. 
The details of OIRA’s review have varied somewhat 
depending on the administration—for example, the 
Clinton administration introduced greater transpar-
ency into the OIRA review process by requiring, inter 
alia, public disclosure of all communications between 
OIRA personnel and individuals not employed by the 
executive branch. But the basic principles have re-
mained the same. To the extent that OIRA finds a “sig-
nificant” federal regulation inconsistent with its cost-
benefit analysis, it can return the regulation to the pro-
mulgating agency (which can then revise or withdraw 
it). Although OIRA’s analysis does not always trump 
that of the agency, it does dominate. Lower-level dis-
putes between OIRA staff and staff at the rulemaking 
agency are resolved by the OIRA administrator. Only 
if an agency head disagrees with the OIRA administra-
tor is there a real fight—in that case, the OMB director 
or the agency head brings the dispute to the attention 
of the President, who is responsible for its resolution. 
OIRA is staffed by career policy analysts with various 
types of social science expertise. Its only political ap-
pointee is the OIRA administrator; in the Obama ad-
ministration, the OIRA administrator is legal scholar 
Cass Sunstein.
The reason OIRA has not maximized net regulatory benefits is 
because it has failed to think proactively about government-wide 
priorities, including innovation.
Proponents of OIRA review might argue that inno-
vation-related benefits and costs can, and should, be 
addressed as part of the more general cost-benefit re-
view done by OIRA. In support of this argument, they 
might note that although existing executive orders re-
quire federal agencies to engage in a variety of special-
ized analyses (addressing, inter alia, the impact of their 
regulations on the environment and on small busi-
nesses), agencies often fail to perform those analyses.20 
They might also contend that putting innovation into 
the global cost-benefit analysis is not only more parsi-
monious but also quite possibly preferable as a norma-
tive matter: specifically, because innovation is not the 
only value that federal regulation may seek to promote, 
putting innovation into the larger context of an overall 
cost-benefit analysis is affirmatively desirable.
We agree that innovation-related impacts of federal 
agency actions can, and should, ultimately be folded 
into a larger cost-benefit analysis. But that does not nec-
essarily mean that analysts within OIRA itself are best 
suited for providing guidance about, or reviewing, the 
“innovation module” of the larger cost-benefit analy-
sis. In fact, even proponents of OIRA do not claim 
OIRA has fully achieved a system in which net regu-
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latory benefits are maximized. In significant part, the 
reason OIRA has not maximized net regulatory ben-
efits is because it has failed to think proactively about 
government-wide priorities, including innovation.21 
Perhaps in response to the widespread criticisms of 
OIRA’s current regulatory review process, the Obama 
administration recently announced plans for, and invit-
ed comments on, a new executive order for regulatory 
review.22 Several of the comments submitted mention 
the importance of using dynamic analyses that empha-
size technological innovation.23 Unfortunately, current 
OIRA staff may be particularly ill equipped to look at 
dynamic innovation impacts. 
The executive order creating the CTO position does not give it 
power to coordinate, rationalize, and spur agency action. We be-
lieve an explicit grant of such power is necessary for an innova-
tion policymaker to have real impact.
Circular A-4 (OIRA’s most recent guidance to admin-
istrative agencies on how to perform cost-benefit anal-
ysis) does mention estimating regulatory benefits and 
costs “based on credible changes in technology over 
time,”24 but its discussion of this issue is very sparse. 
Circular A-4 does not give any sense, for example, of 
how “credibility” should be gauged given the existing 
state of the technological art. Nor does the circular 
discuss with any sophistication the costs and benefits 
of alternative regulatory mechanisms for stimulating 
innovation. The circular’s major contribution in this 
regard is a statement that regulatory performance stan-
dards are generally superior to engineering or design 
standards because they “give regulated parties the flex-
ibility to achieve regulatory objectives in the most cost-
effective way.”25 Although this statement is correct as 
far as it goes, it does not make the obvious point that 
performance standards are also superior because they 
have the capacity to stimulate innovation. The failure of 
Circular A-4 to mention this point may reflect a larger 
lack of concern with, or knowledge of, long-term inno-
vation effects. OIRA’s lack of guidance is particularly 
striking given the substantial literature that models the 
economic effects of technical change, both under the 
assumption that it is exogenous and that it is policy-
induced.
Finally, OIRA’s organizational role, which is limited 
to cost-benefit analyses of major proposed federal 
regulations, is ill-suited for the more varied roles that 
would need to be played by our proposal for innova-
tion-friendly policy. Many of the major government ac-
tors whose actions affect U.S. innovation act primarily 
through adjudication (whether internal agency adjudi-
cation or judicial adjudication) rather than rulemaking. 
So although OIRA could implement the centralized 
focus on innovation that we envision, it is by no means 
the only option, nor is it the best one.
Notably, the Obama administration recently created 
via executive order a Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
position. Under the executive order, the CTO serves as 
both an assistant to the President and as an associate 
director of the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy. Although the executive order does not specify the 
duties of the CTO, President Obama’s announcement 
of Aneesh Chopra as CTO indicated that a component 
of the CTO’s job description would include promoting 
technological innovation in the private sector.  This is 
a useful step forward. However, the executive order 
creating the CTO position does not give it power to 
coordinate, rationalize, and spur agency action. As we 
discuss in Section IV, we believe an explicit grant of 
such power is necessary for an innovation policymaker 
to have real impact. 
In WhIch branch should an InnovaTIon 
polIcymaker be locaTed?
A threshold question is in which branch of the U.S. 
government an innovation policymaker should be lo-
cated. Creating an innovation policymaker in the judi-
cial branch does not make much sense. The most plau-
sible version of such a policymaker would be a court 
(or perhaps a few courts) that had an “innovation mis-
sion” and oversaw all innovation-related cases. Even 
with greater centralization, however, it is difficult to 
imagine courts with the expertise necessary to serve 
as innovation policymakers. And even if that level of 
expertise could somehow be achieved, Article III still 
stands in the way of any federal court acting as the 
ex ante policymaker that would be desirable in at least 
some cases.
As a policy matter, an innovation policymaker that 
improved congressional decisionmaking would appear 
quite attractive. A congressionally controlled regulator, 
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however, cannot exercise any actual power. Several U.S. 
Supreme Court cases—specifically, Bowsher v. Synar 
26 and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. 
Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc.27—
held that Congress could not delegate the power to 
execute laws to a person that Congress controls. The 
result of these cases is a flat prohibition on Congress 
delegating authority to modify or delay laws to entities 
that it controls. Congress still can and should have its 
own entity making recommendations about innova-
tion (perhaps a revived Office of Technology Assess-
ment). Input from such an entity could be valuable in 
persuading members of Congress as well as the general 
public, even if its legal impact was fairly modest. But 
the broader role of innovation policymaker cannot be 
played by an entity that Congress controls.
That leaves the executive branch as the most plausible 
home for an innovation policymaker. Although an 
executive branch entity would not be able to resolve 
problems created by the plain language of statutes, it 
could coordinate and promote a pro-innovation agen-
da that operated within the realm of federal agencies’ 
delegated authority. Additionally, as we discuss further 
below, we would explicitly design our innovation poli-
cymaker—OIP—so as to avoid unnecessary prolifera-
tion of executive branch offices and, relatedly, agency 
obligations.
creaTIng an offIce of InnovaTIon polIcy 
Having proposed that OIP should be located in the ex-
ecutive branch, we now turn to the specifics of OIP’s 
operation: first, should OIP be centralized or decen-
tralized; second, precisely how much legal authority 
should it have; third, what sort of analysis should it 
undertake; and fourth, how should it be created? 
a.  degree of centralization
The tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized 
regulators are well known. To oversimplify greatly, 
centralization allows for efficiency, coordination, and 
clarity, but at the possible cost of bad decisionmaking 
(whether due to the influence of powerful interests or 
otherwise). A centralized regulator might make a bad 
decision and adhere to it without ever squarely, or per-
haps fairly, confronting alternatives. Decentralization 
through the placement of innovation offices in the rel-
evant agencies allows for experimentation and hence 
the opportunity to see real alternatives in action. But 
it achieves experimentation at the cost of a lack of uni-
formity, lack of interorganizational learning, lack of 
focus on the regulatory objective, potentially signifi-
cant transaction costs for regulated entities subject to 
a welter of different regimes, and significant govern-
ment costs arising from so many regulators covering 
similar ground. 
There is no expert entity in the United States that looks at in-
novation generally. The system is entirely piecemeal. Even for 
proponents of a decentralized approach, this is extreme.
We do not seek to rehash the debate over centralization 
versus decentralization here. Our point is simply one 
of balance: U.S. innovation policy within (and outside 
of) the executive branch is currently at a decentralized 
extreme. Even the centralized appeals court for patent 
cases sees only a small portion of innovation-related 
issues (with perhaps the predictable result that its vi-
sion of innovation has historically been one in which 
patents are preeminent). There is no expert entity in 
the United States that looks at innovation generally. 
The system is entirely piecemeal. Even for proponents 
of a decentralized approach, this is extreme. Moreover, 
the costs of such radical decentralization seem particu-
larly high with respect to innovation. Simply stated, it 
makes little sense to continue with a haphazard regime 
in which congressional legislation, agency action, and 
court decisions look at only one particular industry or 
innovation incentive, and none looks more broadly at 
policy through the explicit lens of spurring innova-
tion.
A striking example of the difficulties entailed by de-
centralization is federal agencies’ response to an execu-
tive order that requires them to analyze the impact of 
their decisions on federalism values.28 Agencies have 
largely ignored this requirement—researchers found 
federalism impact statements in less than 1 percent 
of rulemakings, despite the fact that a much higher 
percentage of agency rules would seem to call for fed-
eralism analyses under the guidelines set forth in the 
executive order.29 This finding does not necessarily 
mean that federal agencies have acted in bad faith. The 
problem may well be that agencies are unfamiliar with 
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federalism analysis and deem the resources entailed in 
acquiring the relevant expertise prohibitive. The point 
is simply that asking the existing federal agencies to 
take on new, overarching analyses—whether pertain-
ing to federalism or innovation—is a tall order and 
one that may not be filled very well by the wide range 
of existing agencies. 
What about the other extreme—complete central-
ization? For example, Congress could replace federal 
agencies that currently regulate innovation (whether 
by design or by default) with a new entity that would 
do their jobs and focus entirely on innovation. That is, 
Congress could eliminate agencies with a narrow focus 
on a particular industry or innovation incentive and 
replace them with a “Department of Innovation.”
Complete centralization would represent a massive, 
very costly change—the dislocation and transition 
costs would be great. In part because of those costs, 
complete centralization is very unlikely. It is difficult 
to imagine any realistic state of affairs in which Con-
gress decided to abandon administrative agencies that 
have spent decades building up their own institutional 
knowledge, not to mention abandoning Congress’s 
own familiarity with the agencies.
Moreover, there are considerable advantages in having 
federal agencies with specialized knowledge. Regula-
tion of areas like the environment, telecommunica-
tions, and drug safety is enormously complex. Thus it 
is unlikely that a policymaker with expertise in innova-
tion generally (as opposed to, say, environmental is-
sues specifically) would ever understand the intricacies 
of environmental regulation with sufficient depth to 
make the very finely calibrated decisions that imple-
mentation of environmental statutes requires.
Most importantly, many federal agencies that currently 
regulate innovation also pursue other, equally impor-
tant regulatory objectives. Many FCC commissioners, 
for example, have viewed its “public interest” mission 
as including redistribution and the promotion of salu-
tary programming. Although these objectives could 
conceivably be pursued outside an industry-specific 
context (for example, we might have an agency with 
the mission of “promoting redistribution”), such a re-
orientation is difficult to imagine and seems undesir-
able.
We are left then with some advantages to a horizon-
tal regulator (i.e., a regulator in charge of innovation 
wherever it may arise) and other advantages to vertical 
(or sector-specific) regulators such as the FCC (which 
considers innovation alongside other goals as it regu-
lates telecommunications) or the patent system (which 
considers innovation—to the extent it considers inno-
vation at all—only in the context of patents). Purely 
vertical regulation allows for greater expertise but also 
for tunnel vision and a failure to encourage innovation. 
In contrast, purely horizontal regulation encourages 
innovation but at the cost of sector-specific expertise 
and a focus on other goals.
Even if we reject complete centralization and complete 
decentralization, that still leaves a range of possibili-
ties. Fruitful discussion of these possibilities is inex-
tricably linked to a decision about how much authority 
OIP should have in the first instance. We turn next to 
this question.
b.  What authority should oIp have?
With respect to legal authority, some salient options in-
clude: authority to create and promulgate regulations; 
to amend regulations proposed by existing agencies (or, 
in the case of agencies like the PTO that act primarily 
via adjudication, other agency actions); to block pro-
posed agency actions; to remand (but not permanently 
block) proposed actions for further consideration; to 
delay proposed actions for further review; and/or to 
review proposed actions with no authority to take any 
further action. OIP’s authority could also be enhanced 
via standards of judicial review—for example, mak-
ing its decisions unreviewable, placing a presumption 
behind its recommendations, forcing the substantive 
agency to justify its action if the innovation policymak-
er disapproved of it, or asking whether the agency took 
a hard look at the innovation policymaker’s contrary 
suggestions.
Giving an innovation policymaker the authority to uni-
laterally block or promulgate regulations or adjudica-
tions arguably places innovation above all other goals 
that administrative agencies have and, for that matter, 
turns administrative agencies into mere recommenders 
to the innovation entity. Such concentration of power 
in one entity, and the concomitant privileging of in-
novation above other goals, is excessive. Innovation 
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is tremendously important, and fostering innovation 
should be made an explicit goal of regulatory policy. 
But a goal does not mean the goal. Federal agencies (as 
directed by Congress) have many important goals—for 
example, distributional concerns, health and safety pro-
tection, and the like. Nothing in this report is meant to 
suggest that innovation should replace or overwhelm 
such other goals, and indeed we do not adhere to such 
a position. The burden of demonstrating that innova-
tion should trump all other considerations is a very 
great one, and we do not believe that innovation—or 
any other single consideration—can meet it. 
At the other end of the spectrum, an innovation poli-
cymaker that made recommendations with no legal 
consequences whatsoever also seems unattractive 
because such recommendations would be too easy to 
ignore. There are many entities—governmental and 
otherwise—that can and do make recommendations 
to Congress and to administrative agencies. Without 
the backing provided by some enforcement mecha-
nism, those recommendations often have little weight. 
Merely making recommendations might make sense in 
those situations in which the recommender is bringing 
forward information that was entirely unknown to the 
relevant decisionmaker and the decisionmaker does 
not have a vested interest in ignoring that information. 
But in a significant number of contexts, including the 
innovation context, the initial decisionmaker will often 
have chosen a particular path with some awareness of 
information and arguments that would lead in a differ-
ent direction. The problem is that the decisionmaker 
may suffer from tunnel vision or capture by powerful 
interests, or more generally be unduly influenced by 
interests relevant to its mission that are not consonant 
with the public interest. In those situations, unenforce-
able recommendations will likely produce very little. 
If we want our governing structure to take innovation 
policy seriously, it needs some actual power—some 
ability to alter the course of proposed regulations.
We thus reject the extremes of power (ability to block 
agency action versus hortatory power only. Between 
these extremes, there are a variety of options, and it 
would be folly to claim that there is one perfect choice 
among them. But we think that two axes are of par-
ticular importance, and thinking of the proposed in-
novation policymaker in the context of these axes does 
a fair amount of work.
The first axis is the likelihood of resistance on the part 
of the federal decisionmakers who would respond to 
the innovation policymaker. The discussion so far sug-
gests that the innovation policymaker will propose bet-
ter innovation policies than other decisionmakers will. 
Insofar as other federal entities can be expected to re-
sist the innovation policymaker’s policies—either out 
of bad faith or sincere but misplaced concerns—that 
resistance would counsel in favor of increased power 
for the innovation policymaker.
In the case of major regulations that are currently subject to cost-
benefit review by OIRA, we propose that OIP provide the in-
novation “module” of the analysis.
This is a basic concern that arises whenever a govern-
ment wants to reorient existing behavior. If the White 
House wants to push agency officials to do something 
they are only marginally disinclined to do, a mere rec-
ommendation, or a recommendation backed by a very 
mild sanction, likely would be sufficient to overcome 
the officials’ resistance. A request that officials wear 
a security badge or wash their hands after using the 
bathroom might fall into this category. If, instead, 
there is reason to expect strong resistance on the part 
of agency officials, a bigger club—in the form of 
greater power—might be necessary. Effective integra-
tion of a previously segregated environment (like the 
U.S. armed services before 1948), for example, might 
require an integration enforcer with considerable pow-
ers to overcome the strong resistance of some agency 
officials.
The second axis addresses the same general concern 
with respect to the innovation policymaker: to what 
extent is the policymaker likely to be overeager, push-
ing broader regulatory solutions than would be ideal? 
As with the question regarding resistance from agency 
officials, this is a question about the likelihood of er-
ror compared with an ideal model that will never be 
obtained in reality. We know that there will be devia-
tions from an ideal path, but in some cases the danger 
of overzealousness—whether in seeking to add regula-
tions or block them—will be greater than in others. In-
sofar as that danger increases, it serves as an argument 
for limiting the innovation policymaker’s powers. 
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As we have discussed, we do not favor giving OIP the 
power to block federal agencies’ actions. Once the pos-
sibility of OIP blocking agency action is off the table, 
the danger posed by an overeager regulator is greatly 
reduced. If, as we propose, OIP cannot permanently 
block agency action, interest groups will be aware of 
that limitation. As a consequence, interest groups will 
have less incentive to influence OIP than they would if 
it could block regulations. This obviously means that 
OIP cannot altogether remake government policy in a 
fundamental way, but it also means that it cannot deliv-
er regulatory gains to interest groups—and that means 
the danger of OIP overzealousness is diminished.
OIP should be authorized both to propose new agency action and 
respond to existing agency action. Federal agencies would be sub-
ject to a requirement that they consider and respond to OIP’s 
analysis. 
Turning back to the first axis, we expect some resis-
tance to OIP’s ideas. Federal agencies are familiar with 
the interests of those they regulate. By and large, these 
agencies have not focused on innovation per se and 
have not looked at effects of their actions on the U.S. 
economy as whole (as opposed to their slice of it). This 
fact is not surprising—indeed, it is part of the design 
of agencies—but federal agencies’ lack of familiarity 
with the analysis we are proposing likely will create 
hesitation about adopting it. That said, we do not ex-
pect utter intransigence from federal agencies, because 
empirical evidence does not support the extreme vi-
sion of some public choice theorists: that government 
officials will always do the bidding of powerful inter-
ests who supply them with money, clout, or whatever 
they maximize. Well-funded groups have a great deal 
of influence—indeed, that influence is part of the rea-
son that we do not propose that existing entities do 
the innovation analysis on their own—but influence 
is not control.
Still, the possibility of some agency resistance—
whether in good faith (e.g., tunnel vision) or bad faith 
(e.g., capture by powerful interests)—cannot be dis-
missed.  That possibility leads us to propose a mecha-
nism through which OIP’s policy position would be 
made public, and federal agency officials would be 
obliged to respond to OIP’s position publicly, even 
though such officials would not be obliged to imple-
ment it.
Specifically, in the case of major regulations that are 
currently subject to cost-benefit review by OIRA, we 
propose that OIP provide the innovation “module” of 
the analysis. OIP should provide this analysis ex post, 
as part of the OIRA review, and also ex ante, through 
guidelines to agencies that supplement the current, 
largely static analysis in OIRA’s Circular A-4. In other 
contexts, where OIRA is not involved, OIP could also 
issue guidelines for thinking about impacts on innova-
tion. 
Moreover, OIP should be authorized both to propose 
new agency action and respond to existing agency ac-
tion. Federal agencies would be subject to a require-
ment that they consider and respond to OIP’s analysis. 
OIP’s input could not force the agency to take any par-
ticular action. Rather, the agency would be required 
to consider OIP’s analysis carefully, and to articulate 
a reasoned response that would become part of the 
record to which a court would look in the event of a 
judicial challenge.
At its core, our proposal is for a form of review that 
is quite common in administrative law—“hard look” 
review, in which a court considers whether an agency 
took a hard look at all the significant arguments and 
data, including those that did not support its position, 
in making its policy decisions. If a reviewing court 
finds that an agency failed to take such a hard look 
at an important argument or set of data, the court re-
jects the agency action and remands it to the agency 
for such consideration. The agency can adhere to its 
original position, but it must respond to the counter-
vailing materials. 
Our proposal is that OIP’s input would be submitted 
to the agency and become part of the record before the 
agency. OIP’s submissions would thus qualify as mate-
rial at which the agency should take a hard look, and to 
which the agency would be required to respond. The 
agency could reject OIP’s position, but it could not do 
so without demonstrating that it had considered OIP’s 
ideas and analysis. And a reviewing court would play 
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the familiar role that it plays in hard-look review—
determining whether the agency took a hard look at 
OIP’s submissions to the agency and thus effectively 
requiring the agency to show that it considered them.
There is no guarantee, of course, that the agency will in 
fact sincerely consider OIP’s input, rather than merely 
pay lip service to it. But that is always the danger of 
any system that does not mandate particular outcomes. 
And we believe the public nature of OIP’s input would 
be helpful. The fact that an innovation policymaker 
was publicly questioning a federal agency’s course of 
action would change the regulatory dynamic. The 
agency would have to articulate why the analysis put 
forward by OIP was unpersuasive, and we expect that 
such a requirement would have a disciplining effect 
and render some arguments harder to make.
OIP’s mandate should be to cast the widest possible net in terms 
of gathering information relevant to application of its decision 
principles.
The prospect of hard-look review by a court should be 
sufficient to require federal agencies to take OIP’s in-
put seriously. But we also propose an additional back-
stop against agency recalcitrance in the form of remand 
of agency actions that ignore OIP’s input. This back-
stop would also be the relevant “stick” in cases where 
OIRA was involved. In effect, OIP would be able to 
conduct its own hard-look review, asking whether the 
agency (or OIRA) responded to its arguments and re-
manding the action if it failed to do so. OIP would 
be able to remand only once, so that a truly resistant 
agency could ignore OIP’s original submission and 
its remand, and then promulgate its action as it saw 
fit (subject, of course, to the danger of a court saying 
that it failed to take a hard look at OIP’s input). But 
that seems quite unlikely, given that the agency could 
avoid the time, energy, and litigation risk entailed in 
the strategy above by demonstrating that it seriously 
considered and responded to OIP’s analysis.30
In this regard, the empirical analysis we have done 
(discussed further below) of some recent, innovation-
related FCC rulemakings is instructive. The FCC was 
persuaded by the expert submissions of another gov-
ernmental entity that addresses telecommunications 
policy—the NTIA—even without a formalized role 
for the NTIA in the FCC’s rulemaking process. Creat-
ing a formal role for OIP in agencies’ decisionmaking 
processes, complete with a requirement that agencies 
take a hard look at OIP’s input, will make it only more 
likely that agencies will take OIP’s submissions very 
seriously.
The example of the NTIA’s comments highlights an-
other aspect of OIP’s involvement. Like OIRA, OIP 
would participate in the rulemaking process, rather 
than waiting until an agency’s rulemaking process was 
complete in order to give its input. Requiring OIP to 
wait (as a court must) until an agency completes its 
rulemaking process might entail significant delays in 
the already lengthy rulemaking process. And insofar 
as the agency was persuaded to change its rulemaking, 
some of the agency’s earlier work would have been for 
naught. Having OIP give its input during the forma-
tion of the agency’s rule would allow for much more 
efficiency, and reduce the chances of OIP’s analysis 
adding a lengthy delay in the rulemaking process.
c.  What sort of analysis should oIp undertake, and 
What procedures should It use?
The previous discussion gives shape to the sort of 
analysis OIP should undertake. The primary bases 
upon which OIP might criticize proposed agency ac-
tion would be twofold. First, OIP might find that the 
agency action in question was aimed at promoting in-
novation but did so in a manner that was flawed or at 
cross-purposes with the actions of other agencies. Sec-
ond, OIP might find that the action in question aimed 
to achieve a goal other than innovation but that the 
agency could achieve that goal in a manner less damag-
ing to innovation. OIP would also have the important 
role of providing the innovation component to OIRA’s 
cost-benefit analysis of major regulation.
The principles that OIP would use for its analysis 
would be quite parsimonious, which should also help 
to avoid undue delay. Again, the idea would be not so 
much that individual federal agencies could not use 
the principles, but that such agencies would not nec-
essarily have the motivation and expertise to use the 
principles appropriately. The most important principle 
(which might, in certain cases, represent the entirety of 
OIP’s analysis) would simply be whether, on balance, 
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the proposed regulatory action maximized the sum of 
innovation incentives for all innovators, both current 
and future.
For example, a compulsory access regime for a par-
ticular platform technology might address blockages 
to optimal improvement caused by one of the many ex-
ceptions to the “one monopoly profit”/“internalizing 
complementary externalities” principle.31 To that ex-
tent, the compulsory access regime could improve in-
centives for future innovators. On the other hand, to 
the extent that the compulsory scheme undercompen-
sated the platform innovator, it might decrease incen-
tives for future platform innovators (including innova-
tors that might come up with alternative platforms). 
More immediately, if the platform was not purely a 
knowledge platform (e.g., if it was a physical platform 
such as broadband cable), compulsory access might 
decrease incentives to maintain or improve the plat-
form.
OIP’s mandate should be to cast the widest possible 
net in terms of gathering information relevant to ap-
plication of its decision principles. OIP would seek 
input from other agencies—both regulatory and fund-
ing agencies. It could also learn from nongovernment 
actors, including familiar sources like think-tanks and 
academics, along with less familiar ones like prediction 
markets and other means of harnessing the wisdom of 
crowds.32
In considering the procedures OIP should use, we 
might ask whether administrative law requirements 
that are intended to secure public input—in particular, 
public comments—should apply to OIP. With respect 
to transparency, the answer is clear. At a minimum, 
transparency requirements similar to those imposed 
on OIRA during the Clinton administration should 
apply. And as we noted above, OIP’s input would be 
part of the record before the agency and thus would 
be publicly disclosed. There is of course the question 
of compliance. Commentators have complained that 
OIRA’s compliance with transparency obligations 
has been incomplete. OIP would presumably have a 
greater interest in transparency than does OIRA: un-
like OIRA, OIP would not be able to block agency 
action, so OIP’s authority would flow from the degree 
to which it could persuade others to accept its views. 
Because it would have somewhat less inherent power 
than OIRA, OIP would need to make greater use of 
the “bully pulpit.”
Implicit in the discussion above are basic elements of 
OIP’s procedures—gathering information, conduct-
ing analysis, and communicating its ideas. These are 
the core aspects of almost any decisionmaking process 
for any entity. The real question is whether OIP’s pro-
cesses would include the central distinctive element of 
the informal rulemaking process under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA): the requirement of a 
process pursuant to which members of the public can 
comment on proposed federal regulations. Neither 
agency decisionmaking nor judicial review of agency 
actions requires a comment process, so its costs and 
benefits in the context of innovation regulation are 
worth careful consideration. 
Creation of an innovation policymaker via executive order is the 
most attractive, and feasible, path.
There is a longstanding debate among commentators 
about the benefits of the comment process. Kenneth 
Culp Davis, for instance, praised the notice-and-
comment process as “one of the greatest inventions 
of modern government,” because it allows citizens to 
participate in the lawmaking process.33 David Bar-
ron and Elena Kagan have suggested that “notice 
and comment often functions as charade” and that 
“notice-and-comment rulemaking today tends to pro-
mote a conception of the regulatory process as a forum 
for competition among interest groups, rather than a 
means to further the public interest.”34 
The central cost of the comment process is straight-
forward: the relevant agency’s time in reading, assess-
ing, and, when appropriate, responding to the various 
comments. Even if comments turn out to add little, 
the agency has to read and assess them in order to 
make that determination. That alone is a substantial 
use of agency resources. Then there is the time and en-
ergy required to demonstrate that the agency has taken 
a hard look at whichever arguments and data in the 
comments a court may later find significant and thus 
require an agency response.
The more difficult issue involves evaluating the bene-
fits of comments. We took a close look at the comment 
process in three recent FCC proceedings relating to 
innovation to see what role it played there. The rule-
makings involved media ownership rules, proposals 
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for broadband Internet services over power lines, and 
the use of “white spaces” in the broadcast spectrum 
(frequencies used as buffers and thus not occupied by 
transmitters) by new services. All three of these FCC 
proceedings attracted significant public interest and 
large numbers of comments from individual citizens. 
We chose them on the theory that the increased amount 
of public comment was likely to present the strongest 
case of individuals’ impact on the rulemaking process. 
For each proceeding, we examined who submitted 
comments to the FCC; how often those comments 
were inconsistent with the economic interests of the 
commenters; how often the comments contained argu-
ments or information that was not contained in earlier 
comments; whose comments the FCC responded to 
in its resulting order; and whose comments the FCC 
agreed with in its resulting order.
Our conclusions from our review of the comment 
process for these three FCC proceedings are not en-
couraging. We found that comments were submitted 
disproportionately by well-organized groups. None 
of the comments was against the economic interests 
of the relevant commenters. And the vast majority of 
comments from private and public interest groups, and 
virtually all the comments from private citizens (which 
were mainly form letters), were duplicative of com-
ments that had already been submitted. In contrast 
to the literal duplication entailed in form letters, the 
comments from organized interest groups used differ-
ent words and different phrasing. But when we looked 
closely at the substance of the points that commenters 
made, we found a very high degree of duplication. The 
words differed, but the arguments did not.
The bottom line is that the comment process yielded 
little more than we might expect from a bare-bones lob-
bying process. The ideas and information that seemed 
important (both to us in reading the comments and 
to the FCC in responding to them) could be expected 
to be made by any given lobbyist on a particular side 
of the issue. All the other comments on the same side 
added little. 
In sum, the results of the available theoretical and em-
pirical work, including our own, strongly suggest that 
an APA-style public comment process is not essential, 
or even particularly helpful, for purposes of improving 
innovation regulation.35
d.  how should oIp be created?
One big advantage of our proposal over other possible 
mechanisms for improving U.S. innovation policy is 
that, while it can be implemented via legislation, it can 
also be implemented by executive order. The President 
can (and often does) create new offices via executive 
order, and giving a new office the authority to submit 
materials to agencies raises no constitutional issues. 
The only constitutional concern raised by an OIP cre-
ated by the President through executive order would 
involve the President’s ability to authorize OIP to 
remand regulations back to independent agencies, as 
opposed to executive agencies. Some executive orders 
on federal regulation have refrained from giving enti-
ties like OIRA the ability to block regulations issued 
by independent agencies, authorizing such power only 
with respect to executive agency regulations.36 How-
ever, there is no case law holding that giving an entity 
created by executive order the power to block indepen-
dent agencies’ regulations would be unconstitution-
al.37 In any event, we are not proposing a veto (which 
OIRA effectively has), but instead what amounts to a 
delay. OIP can remand only once and cannot force the 
agency to do anything, so an agency that refused even 
to read OIP’s input would be subject only to a delay in 
promulgating its regulation. The weight of commen-
tary indicates that such a procedure would not violate 
the separation of powers. So although Congress could 
eliminate any question by passing legislation giving 
this power to OIP, we do not believe that would be 
necessary.
The advantage of having an OIP that can be created 
by executive order is quite significant. Indeed, creat-
ing OIP by executive order makes it much more likely 
that an effective OIP will in fact be created. There are 
several reasons. One is the simple fact that it is eas-
ier to persuade the President to promulgate a policy 
than to persuade veto-proof majorities in the House 
and Senate. Another reason is that there is widespread 
agreement that the President is more politically ac-
countable to the national public than Congress. As a 
result, the President has greater reason to be concerned 
about the overall health of the national economy. And 
the innovation with which we are concerned may well 
negatively affect some regions of the country even as 
it helps others (the costs and benefits of innovation 
are sometimes geographically lumpy). Simply stated, 
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the President’s broader electoral constituency makes 
him more responsive to majoritarian preferences than 
Congress. As a result, creation of an innovation poli-
cymaker via executive order is the most attractive, and 
feasible, path.
It also bears noting both that the proposed OIP should 
face less danger of capture by powerful interests than 
other institutions do and that the absolute danger of 
such capture would be reasonably low. We have already 
noted two reasons for this: OIP will not be able to block 
regulations, and it will have both an obligation and an 
incentive to operate transparently. But another reason 
is significant as well: OIP’s broad scope will make cap-
ture more difficult, and therefore less likely. The classic 
case of capture arises when an agency (or congressional 
committee) covers one or two industries. The major 
incumbents from those industries (or from advocacy 
groups with an interest in these industries) can band 
together and exert a huge amount of influence. That 
is the story, for instance, with respect to broadcasters’ 
decades-long influence at the FCC. An entity that takes 
a cross-cutting approach to all regulation is less subject 
to the power of a few major stakeholders precisely be-
cause there will not be a few major stakeholders. Some 
of the entities affected by OIP will of course be pow-
erful, but they will also be diffuse and they will not 
necessarily be repeat players, making it less likely that 
they will find it worth their time and energy to orga-
nize themselves much better than citizens groups are 
organized. Thus the logic of collective action should 
not produce the results that we see with more narrowly 
focused agencies.
conclusIon
Promoting innovation is a critical goal of U.S. public 
policy, and it can take many forms: direct investment, 
tax incentives, procurement, etc. One crucial element 
of U.S. innovation policy that has been given short 
shrift, however, is structuring federal regulatory policy 
so that it promotes—or at least does not retard—inno-
vation. Currently, there is no formal process within the 
executive branch to ensure that this happens. 
There is no perfect mechanism for improving U.S. 
innovation policy, but we conclude that the best ap-
proach would be to establish an Office of Innovation 
Policy that could serve as an innovation policymaker 
within the U.S. government. Thus we propose that 
President Obama create OIP by executive order and 
provide it with enough authority to be able to have a 
significant positive impact on innovation policy, but 
without giving it so much power that it can run rough-
shod over the other agencies.
We believe OIP should have sufficient power to have 
the experiment be meaningful, and that OIP should be 
able to continue indefinitely if the experiment works 
out well.38 Some might question the significance of our 
proposal. Isn’t creating OIP a fairly small change to the 
system? Certainly adding OIP to the existing mix is a 
smaller change than jettisoning the existing substan-
tive agencies in favor of a new agency with authority 
to regulate, and increase, innovation in all fields. But 
we believe that implementing this proposal will sig-
nificantly change the regulatory environment. First, an 
entity focused on innovation would add an important 
new voice to the regulatory conversation. There would 
now be an entity speaking clearly and forthrightly on 
the centrality of innovation. Second, and more impor-
tant, OIP would not merely have a voice: it would be 
able to remand agency actions that harm innovation. It 
would also have as part of its mission proposing regu-
lation that benefits innovation. This is no small matter. 
Indeed, it would change the regulatory playing field 
overnight.
To those who might oppose an OIP on the grounds 
that making predictions about the future is very dif-
ficult—and experts are often wrong when they make 
such predictions—our response is straightforward: 
Agencies are already making predictions about the fu-
ture (whether consciously or not) when they make laws 
that affect innovation. They are simply doing so in a 
manner that is unsystematic, haphazard, and subject to 
undue influence by well-funded incumbents. We can 
do better.
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